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PRINCIPAL AND SURETY - DISCHARGE OF SURETY FOR A LESSEE BY
AssIGNMEN'I' OF THE LEASE - Lands set aside by statute as common property
of the Chickasaw and Choctaw Indian tribes were, pursuant to an act of
Congress/ leased to one Gunther by mining trustees of the tribes. The lease
contained covenants to pay "stipulated annual advance royalties," and also provided that no assignment should be made without the consent of the trustees
"subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior." Defendant surety
company executed a bond for the faithful performance of the terms of the lease,
and the same was duly approved. Then Gunther, with the consent of the
trustees, but not the approval of the Secretary of the Interior or surety, assigned
the lease. to a mining company in which he owned 298 of the 300 shares of
stock. From 1925 to 1930 the company failed to pay royalties falling due. In
1930 the surety, then notified of the assignment, entered into an agreement
with the company whereby the latter should build up a fund for payment of the
past due royalties. A small amqunt had been paid to the federal government on
account when suit was instituted against Gunther and the surety for the balance. Held, over the defenses of assignment and alteration of the contract and
estoppel, that the surety company was liable. American Surety Co. of New York
v. United, States, (C. C. A. 10th, 1940) n2 F. (2d) 903.
Due to the sovereign nature of the government of the United States, and
especially where the government is acting as a guardian, it has certain privileges

1

37 Stat. L. 1007 (1913).
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in litigation which ordinarily are denied to the private citizen. Thus the defense
of estoppel entered by the defendant in the principal case was readily swept
aside as hindering the government in effectuating its protective powers. 2 The
court declared that the assignment was wholly void because the approval of the
Secretary of the Interior had not been obtained, and thus there was no alteration.
But even if the court had held the assignment to be valid, it would seem that the
defense of alteration would necessarily be futile under the facts of this case.
Therefore, the government did not have to rely on any "sovereign can do no
wrong" theory. If the lessor in the principal case had not been allowed to deny
the validity of the assignment, but had been able only to recover for the breach
of the covenant not to assign without consent, and to recognize the new lessee
or re-enter, it seems the surety would still be liable on its bond. The ordinary
contract surety is discharged if there has been a material alteration of the contract 3 or the parties 4 without his consent. The alteration manifests itself by a
subsequent agreement between the principal and creditor altering their original
legal relationship existing at the inception of the suretyship. It would seem that
the element of consent is the controlling element in determining whether there
has been a discharge of the surety on the original obligation when such alteration
occurs. The consent may be manifested expressly, 5 or may be implied from the
surrounding circumstances,6 which include the risk involved by the alteration.
If the change is one which commonly occurs under a contract like the original,
the surety is held to have anticipated this when he guaranteed his principal's
performance and thus his consent to the alteration is implied.7 However, the
courts seem to feel that if the risk is increased, the surety is discharged if no
actual consent exists, since he certainly did not contemplate additional risks
when he became a surety. 8 The same rules might be applied to leases. However,
the courts seem to distinguish between simple assignments and subsequent alteration of provisions of the lease. In the latter, emphasis is placed on increased risk/
while in the former, implicit consent depends solely on whether or not the
assignment was contemplated by the surety when he guaranteed the perform2 Sternfeld v. United States, (D. C. N. Y. 1929) 32 F. (2d) 789; Volker v.
McDonald, 120 Neb. 508, 233 N. W. 890 (1931); Huron Portland Cement Co.
v. Woodworth, (D. C. Mich. 1921) 19 F. (2d) 530; State ex rel. Stephan v. Taylor,
44 Idaho 353, 256 P. 953 (1927).
8
United States ex rel. Townshend v. Robson, (D. C. W. Va. 1935) 9. F. Supp.
446; National Surety Co. v. New Mexico, (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) 16 F. (2d) 873;
United States v. Freel, 186 U. S. 309, 22 S. Ct. 875 (1902); Cross v. Allen, 141
U.S. 528, 12 S. Ct. 67 (1891).
"Wanamaker v. Shoemaker, 70 Pa. Super. 473 (1918); Bensinger v. Wren, 100
Pa. 500 (1882); Spokane Union Stockyards Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 105
Wash. 306, 178 P. 3 (1919).
5
Powell v. Fowler, 851 Ark. 451, 108 S. W. 827 (1908); Marion Savings Bank
v. Leahy, 200 Iowa 220, 204 N. W. 456 (1925).
6
Jamieson v. Capron, 95 Pa. 15 (1880); Commonwealth v. Mendelsohn, 83
Pa. Super. 593 (1924).
1 Id.
8
Nichols v. Palmer, 48 Wis. 110, 4 N. W. 137 (1879); Prior v. Kiso, 81 Mo.
241 (1883).
9
Id.
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ances by the lessee.10 Since a simple assignment of a lease leaves the assignor
in privity of contract with the lessor with no change of legal obligations or
duties, the risk involved has hardly been altered, thus the courts' failure to
talk "risk'' under such circumstances. It is generally held that an assignment
without the surety's consent, which was not so contemplated, relieves him of
further liability.11 In the principal case, however, there is necessarily a contemplation of assignment since a covenant not to assign without consent assumes
that there shall be assignments, but that consent is needed to prevent a breach
of such covenant. Moreover, assignments in violation of such covenants are
valid,1 2 and thus liability of the surety should continue on the principles discussed above. If the original lessee is relieved of liability, however, it is generally held that the surety is discharged,13 for then an alteration of parties occurs
in the eyes of the law. Thus, if it could have been shown in the principal case
that the assignment was really a substitution of the company as lessee for Gunther, and that the company only was liable on both privity of contract and
estate, then, the court might have said that such a peculiar type of "assignment"
released the surety of Gunther. If this theory had been advanced by the surety,
the government would have been forced to argue, as it actually did, that the
"assignment" was wholly void; and to rebut the defense of estoppel and laches
the government would have had to rely on its sovereign position.14

H. Martin Pecko'lJer

10 Morgan v. Smith, 70 N. Y. 537 (1877); Stein v. Jones, 18 Ill. App. 543
(1886); Weinsklar Realty Co. v. Dooley, 200 Wis. 412, 228 N. W. 515 (1930).
11 An assignment is contemplated only if the right to assign exists. See 50 C. J.
97 (1930), which says: "if the right to assign is negatived in the lease, its assignment, if accepted by the lessor will release a surety of the lessee. • • ." If assignment
is contemplated, the surety is not released. See Morgan v. Smith, 70 N. Y. 537 (1877);
Verschleiser v. Newman, 76 Misc. 544, 135 N. Y. S. 671 (1912).
12 Meyer v. Alliance Investment Co., 84 N. J. L. 450, 87 A. 476 (1913), affd.
86 N. J. L. 694, 92 A. 1086 (1914).
18 Murphy v. Ottmann, 127 App. Div. 563, 1 II N. Y. S. 912 (1908). See the
discllSSion of this case in Verschleiser v. Newman, 76 Misc. 544, 135 N. Y. S. 671
(1912); School District No. 37 in Butler City v. Aetna Accident & Liability Co.,
(Mo. App. 1921) 234 S. W. 1017; Brill v. Friedhoff, 102 Misc. 565, 169 N. Y. S.
193 (1918); Fayette Title & Trust Co. v. Maryland, Pennsylvania & West Virginia
Tel. & Tel. Co., (C. C. Pa. 1910) 180 F. 928.
14 On the theory presently discussed, the government could have had performance
guaranteed by three parties; however, by declaring the assignment ineffective, it must
rely on only two. This discussion is not an attempt to favor nor derogate the method
used in the principal case; rather it is merely a disCUS8ion of alternatives.

